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MR. SOVEN: We are going to move to what
really makes up the bulk of the competition work out
there, which is mergers.

Of course, over the last few

days there has been a lot hubbub and highlight and
noise and discussion about the dominance and abuse of
dominance by four or five large technology companies,

2

but the fact of the matter is the bulk of the work on
the ground overwhelmingly is in mergers.

Those take

up the bulk of the resources in the antitrust agencies
throughout the world, they take up the bulk of the
work in law firms and competition outfits and
consulting firms throughout the world, and they take
up the bulk of the competition resources in companies.
We are very privileged today to have a
fantastic panel to dive into what really is leadingedge stuff that is not old but quite new.
Very briefly, I’m Josh Soven.
Partner at Wilson Sonsini.

I am a

Before that, I spent a

bunch of time at the Federal Trade Commission and the
Justice Department.
But, far more important than me, let me
introduce our panelists are. Isabelle de Silva, who is
the President of the French Competition Authority.
Isabelle, my children speak accent-free French, but I
do not, so I will not make an attempt at the French.
Daniel Francis is the Deputy Director of the Bureau of
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Competition at the FTC and has also held a number of
positions there.

Bruce Hoffman, a partner at Cleary

Gottlieb, before that was Daniel’s boss in some sense
as the Director of the Bureau of Competition.

Axel

Schulz is a Partner at White & Case.
One of the fantastic things about Fordham —
and I think I am certainly privileged to speak here
because of it — is, unlike so many conferences, it
does not center around six square blocks in
Washington, D.C.; it covers a lot of ground beyond
that.
In that spirit, we are going to kick it off
with Isabelle, and I am going to try to manage the
topics and keep us on the road but otherwise be a good
moderator and get out of the way.
Isabelle, the French Competition Authority
has recently issued some new merger guidelines.

Why

don’t you go ahead and tell us what is new, what’s not
so new, and generally how you are thinking about
merger policy as we keep moving into the 21st century?
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MS. DE SILVA:
everyone.

Thank you, and hello to

I am glad to be at Fordham for this event.
The new merger guidelines that we published

very recently are part of the major overhaul that we
did of the merger procedure in France.

Three years

ago, we started a consultation with stakeholders to
ask them about whether the merger thresholds were
appropriate, whether the substance should be reviewed,
and whether the process could be improved.

In this

process we proposed an important number of changes.
The first change was to ask companies for
less information for their merger filings.

The first

part was the simplification of the information
request, which was introduced by a decree in our law.
The second thing was to expand the scope of
the simplified procedure, and also, in addition to
that, the creation of a fully online notifying
procedure for the simplest mergers.
Another part was about substance, whether
the national framework was appropriate, considering
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the changes we have in the merger landscape, so we
decided that it was not appropriate to introduce new
value transaction thresholds, like Germany and Austria
have done recently.

We felt that it was more

appropriate to have a new form of targeted merger
control to catch those transactions that have a very
strong competitive impact.

I will come back to this

when we talk about the Article 22 of the 2004
Regulation, news that had been announced by Margrethe
Vestager a few days ago.
What about those new merger guidelines?

It

was a lot of work because we decided to take into
account ten years of application of the law to mergers
in France.

What we tried to do was, first, to make

those guidelines very informative, even more so than
they used to be, by introducing all the big decisions
that companies must take into account, trying to help
them to prepare their cases for the Authority.
What is new in substance in those
guidelines?
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First, we decided to devote quite some time
to the issue of procedural infringements.

As you may

know, we had a big case concerning gun-jumping in
France three years ago where we issued a €80 million
fine to Altice, a company that had implemented the
merger too soon.

So we really devoted quite some

effort in the guidelines to explain to companies how
they can avoid receiving such a fine and going into
conduct that might be considered as gun-jumping: for
example, how they use “clean teams” when they are
preparing for the merger; or how can they use
covenants without infringing our law; or another
example, how they can concretely continue to act as
competitors until the day when we finally approve the
merger.
Another issue that is quite important is
commitment.

We take commitment very seriously.

We

recently issued a €20 million fine to Fnac Darty, a
company that had failed to sell some of its
subsidiaries it was compelled to sell in the merger
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decision.

In the guidelines we make an overview of

all the jurisprudence about commitments and how they
must be applied.
Another chapter that we developed quite a
lot in those new guidelines concerns the issue of
digital and online retail, how it affects our analysis
when we have to look at mergers that involve
distributors and how do we compare the market power of
companies with their shops and online.

So we have in

the guidelines a very precise methodology that
explains how we take into account online sales in the
retail sector.
That is what is new.
Maybe one last point is the issue of the
timeframe that we take into account.

As you know,

classically the Commission and the French Authority
take into account what is going to happen in the two
years after the merger.

It has been debated whether

this two-year reference was appropriate considering
the profound digital changes, for example in the
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digital economy.

We developed this part of the new

merger guidelines to say which are the cases in which
we could take into account some more years when we try
to forecast what the effect of the merger will be.
Maybe a final word.

This document is now

ready and is applicable, but we also have a very
important exercise that is going on within the
European Competition Network, which is the revision of
the EU Market Definition Notice.

This is a document

that dates back to 1997 and now really needs a
complete update to take into account the digital
economy.

When this work is finished in the next few

months, I think that we will have a good setup at the
national and European level especially to take into
account all the changes that we have known in the
digital economy.
Thank you.
MR. SOVEN:

Great.

Time permitting, I am

going to come back with a whole bunch of questions,
which I haven’t told the panelists I am going to ask
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but we will give it a shot anyway.
In the meantime, Axel — you are on the
ground — what is your reaction based on Isabelle’s
excellent overview?

I hear a lot of change, and a lot

of change that could hit the ground really quickly.
MR. SCHULZ:

Yes, it seems like it.

To be

honest, I have not read the guidelines in detail, but
from what I have heard from Isabelle right now, it
does indeed seem to reflect the very excellent
practice of the French Competition Authority over the
years.
She mentioned Altice, which was obviously a
big bang in Europe, and companies are quite nervous
about what they can do and what they cannot do.

And I

know that there was already — I think two years ago
maybe — a paper which was published by the Authority
on this particular point, so I assume that has been
now lifted over into the guidelines.
Also, I think the French Authority, probably
together with the German Authority, has been one of
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the two authorities in Europe looking really at the
digital retail market, the other one being the German
Authority that has been occasionally divergent, with
different views — “Can I block my retailer from sales
on Amazon or not?,” this kind of question — so I am
curious to see what the guidelines say there.

But

again, I assume that they will reflect what the case
law in France has provided in the last few years.

So

it is probably quite an interesting read.
I have also seen that you had your first
merger decision which blocked a case.
MS. DE SILVA:
the French Authority.

Yes.

Is that right?

This was a first for

The case we blocked was a

three-to-two merger in a local retail distribution
case that went to Phase II.

The case was interesting

because we really used all our toolkit to have a very
refined evaluation of how this merger would impact the
local customers.
In a way, it is surprising that it took us
ten years to say no to a merger, but in reality, as
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you practitioners know, many deals are abandoned in
the last run when the companies feel that the
Authority does not see an easy way out for the merger.
Maybe another case that is interesting to
mention was just a few weeks before that decision we
were on the verge of saying no to a big merger that
was leading to taking the control of an oil pipeline
which is restructuring in France.

This could have

been another first merger decision that could end with
a prohibition.
It is interesting to see that, at least in
France, not many companies take the risk of going to
the final prohibition decision and try to challenge
them in court.

I don’t know if they feel that they

would lose anyway, but we do not have that many
decisions that have gone to court after a prohibition.
So maybe this could be the first one.
MR. SOVEN:

I think there are a couple of

ways to think about that.

You can think about it as

“Well, look, the enforcement process is efficient in
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that it is reaching resolution where people really
understand what is going on.”

On the other hand, you

could say, “Well, maybe at times the risks, the
transaction costs, are so great that procompetitive
mergers, or ones where there are reasonable bases for
argument, might be getting stopped when they shouldn’t
be.”

We can come back to that.
Axel, as Isabelle noted and as you alluded

to, Brussels — post-Brexit or pre-Brexit, it doesn’t
seem to matter — is quite active.
Commissioner Vestager is making news quite
often, which is appropriate for the time.

She

delivered what I think many view as a seminal or
foundational speech in September of this year.
to digest there.

A lot

Why don’t you give us your take on

that?
MR. SCHULZ:

Indeed, it was a very

interesting speech, and it did mark the existence of
thirty years of the European Merger Regulation, and so
it was obviously quite well timed.
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First of all, apart from her speech, I think
the good news is that, following the first few weeks
of the Covid-19 lockdown in Brussels, things are
totally back to normal.

Things are proceeding

perfectly, I think, between the European Commission
and the practitioners. That is something I just wanted
to mention.
Back to Commissioner Vestager’s speech.
After thirty years of the Merger Regulation, she did
make the point that merger enforcement is as important
as ever, if not even more important.

She referred

back to the 1930s, the Great Depression in the United
States — and I didn’t know that before reading her
speech — when the rules for merger control were
relaxed in the United States, and apparently this
didn’t quite help the economy come back into shape
after the Great Depression.
She said that we definitely need to have
merger control enforcement even today, even if we are
going through probably the biggest recession certainly
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of our careers.
I want to pick out two points, and I think
we will come back to the topic of nascent competition
on substance.
One thing that she discussed was: Are we
managing currently to pick up cases that fly under the
radar; how are we doing this?

Isabelle also said that

when they looked at their guidelines, they decided not
to impose or adopt value-based thresholds, as in
Germany and Austria.

The same is true for the

European Commission and the Merger Regulation, which
do not have value-based thresholds.
But the problem of nascent competition, or
killer acquisitions, or whatever you call it, is
there.

In cases where established companies merge and

the Commission sees that some products are in the
pipeline and maybe one of the two companies would stop
the innovation in their pipeline and only proceed with
one of the innovations, that is okay; these cases can
be picked up when we are talking about established
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companies, like big pharma companies, because
somewhere chances are that the turnover thresholds are
met.
The problem is for the regulators: How do we
pick up cases where the target companies have no
turnover?
One solution was, as adopted in Germany and
Austria a few years ago, to have a value-based
threshold, like in the USSR.

The Commission had

looked at this a few years ago in Commissioner
Vestager’s first time, and she wasn’t convinced, I
believe.

And even this time around that is not what

the Commission wants to do.
So what is the solution for the Commission?
Isabelle mentioned this as well already. Article 22,
which has always been in the Merger Regulation, a
referral system, whereby Member State authorities can
refer a case to the European Commission.

That is all

fine if the threshold or the test at the national
level is met.

Then there is jurisdiction in a given
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Member State and that Member State can refer the case
up to the European Commission.
Now the suggestion is that cases could also
be referred up to the Commission by Member States
where the international test is not met.

And yes,

there have been cases very early on in the life of the
Merger Regulation where some Member States did not
have a merger control system yet and they thought,
This case really should be looked at by someone.

We

can’t do it, so let’s refer it to the European
Commission.

But this was really thirty or twenty-five

years ago.
So the big question is really now in my
view: Is this a practical solution or does this create
a huge legal uncertainty?

That is to be debated.

The Commission has said they will issue
guidelines.

I wonder whether guidelines can establish

a legal requirement to make a notification.

That is

to be discussed, but this is certainly an interesting
point and I think we will come back to that many
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times.
The other thing that she said is very
welcome actually.

She talked about simplification.

In a way — never waste a good crisis — in Europe it is
actually very hard to get on the clock.

You see this

often, all of you, when you advise companies when you
have to do a filing in the United States and a filing
in Europe: it is always the case that within weeks the
HSR filing goes in and half a year later we are still
in prenotification in Brussels.

It is a thing that

creates tension.
I always thought somewhere things can be
held back.

I think now the Commission is now also

warming to this again, trying to somehow simplify
again the simplified procedure, which is very good,
but over the years it became not so simple anymore to
follow the simplified rules.

There were still rounds

of prenotifications, RFIs; have you captured all
market shares under any plausible market definition?
This is a very plausible [inaudible] — an alien word
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in Brussels — and hopefully we can simplify this
again.
Also, do we need prenotifications in every
case?

Commissioner Vestager now suggests maybe not

and they should look into that.

Again, there are a

number of jurisdictions out there, including Germany
for example — I’m not actually sure about France, but
certainly in Germany 80 percent of the cases go in
without a prenotification, and I think nobody would
suggest there is underenforcement in Germany.
So these are welcome things.

There isn’t

anything concrete.
Maybe one idea from me would be to increase
the market share threshold for what amounts to an
“affected market” — so maybe you go up a little bit
from 20 percent to 25-30 percent — maybe coupled with
a small incremental market share, so a combined market
share of 30 percent.

If the increase is only 2

percent, that could still be an unaffected market and
it would make life easier for many people.
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That is a very welcome development, I think,
but we will see exactly how the Commission will
address these points.
So, hopefully, this is good in Brussels and
we can simplify it again.
I will stop here.
MR. SOVEN:

That was great, Axel.

One quick note.

Thanks.

I have been notified that I

have committed the cardinal sin of any moderator,
which is I have not announced the CLE code, and I am
required by law to do that twice. Very briefly, before
I turn it back to Isabelle, it is MIGP20.
Isabelle, a lot there.

I will pick out my

favorites, but since you are the president of a
competition authority, you should certainly pick up on
what you want.
The issue of referrals and who is doing what
and what we’re looking at and what we’re not looking
at, at least on the U.S. side, it seems like there is
a lot to unpack there and it is a challenge to advise
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clients.
MRS. DE SILVA: Thank you, Josh, and thank
you, Axel.
I received with great enthusiasm the
announcement by Margrethe Vestager that the European
Commission is willing to reconsider its traditional
interpretation of Article 22.

We have now advocated

for some time, a few years now, the fact that there
was a loophole in the merger regime in Europe at the
national level, because such transactions as
Facebook/WhatsApp or Facebook/Instagram, even
transactions that are not in the digital sphere but
come in the biotech industry, can have a profound
impact on the market and the target may have no
turnover at all or a turnover that is below the
threshold.
So we really felt that there was something
that was lacking.

It might be only one or two mergers

that we miss every year, but those mergers might be
crucial and might completely redefine the dynamics of
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the market.
I think that the solution of coming back to
the roots of Article 22 to its letter and to its
objective is the best one because this means that we
do not have to open Regulation 2004; we have already
the text to apply.
Of course, this is something that is met
with skepticism or anxiety by businesses and counsel.
When we had the consultations with those people at the
national level, our competition lawyers’ association
and business organizations were quite skeptical or
reluctant about this change, even though a few major
companies advocated such a change.
I think that now the next step will be to
have a guidance about which are the types of mergers
we might look into through this new interpretation of
Article 22.
In my view, this is not something that
should be limited to digital.

It might also have an

interest to make sure that some dominant companies are
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not allowed to buy their last competitors and to
completely stifle competition in their market.
I think that now we have a few months ahead
of us to discuss which could be the priorities and how
would it work quite practically.

We know how to do

referrals; this is something that is quite common in
the European Competition Network.

I think it is a

good time to have a discussion at the level of the
European Competition Network, but also of course with
businesses and lawyers, to make sure that there is not
the sort of incertitude that hampers deals that should
never be subject to that procedure.
I think that with a lot of explanation and
discussion we will be able to alleviate those fears
and be able to catch those mergers that are of
critical importance.

It is not only about what we

might call killer acquisitions; it is also about
acquisitions where the target is not killed at all but
it comes and reinforces the dominant company’s
strength or the value of the companies that decided to

23

merge.
I will stop there, not to be too long on
this topic, on which I could speak a lot.
MR. SOVEN:
there.

Daniel, a lot to choose from

I know U.S. competition authorities are

appropriately discreet and measured and everyone has
to think about which parts of the foreign competition
landscape or international competition landscape they
want to comment on and which parts they don’t.

Why

don’t you pick out a few “greatest hits” of what you
are hearing from Europe?
MR. FRANCIS:

That sounds great, Josh.

Thank you.
Let me start by keeping myself out of FTC
jail: everything I am going to say today is on my own
account; I am not speaking for the Commission or for
any individual Commissioner.

I don’t know how we do

the FTC dungeon when we are working from home, but I
am sure it won’t be pleasant.
Let me just pick a couple things to respond
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to, and maybe I will say something about the themes of
what I thought was a terrific speech and then just
touch briefly on a couple points of substance.
I took some of the themes in the
Commissioner’s speech to really touch on things that I
think all of us antitrust enforcers around the world
are focused on a lot at the moment, including but not
limited to digital enforcement.
First, what I really took to be a kind of
framing observation or a framing impetus for a lot of
the Commissioner’s remarks, was response to fastchanging markets and how antitrust enforcers should
respond to change and to the uncertainty that it
creates.
On that, I will just say that I think our
answer to that question, our institutional response —
and to preview something we might talk about later,
the response of courts — to the fact of rapid
competitive change and the uncertainty that it
generates in some of the things that are very
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important to our everyday work will probably have,
perhaps more than anything else, to say about how our
antitrust system responds to what we sometimes call
the digital economy.
That is as true for competitively
significant acquisitions.

I notice that Isabelle is a

fellow warrior in the fight to keep the term “killer
acquisition” applied to the specific context of a
target that is where the product or service is shelved
— but it is true in potential and nascent competition
cases as well.

So we are thinking about those things

also.
The second theme that I took from her speech
was that the Commission is pursuing its effort to
focus antitrust enforcement on what really matters to
competition, and not treating all things alike but
responding to what in particular in some individual
case or some individual market affects competition.
I thought those themes resonated a lot with
a lot of what we are thinking about and what I know is
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on the mind of other enforcers as well.
Let me just say a couple things about some
of the substantive developments.
The first is obviously thresholds and
notification thresholds.
issue around the world.

This is a sort of hot-button
We, of course, are thinking

very hard, including but not limited to in our
hearings last year and year before and in some of our
internal reflections since then, about the
consequences and the limits of our merger notification
system.
If you think of antitrust in general, and
perhaps digital antitrust in particular, as a
knowledge problem, then Hart-Scott-Rodino notification
is a critical tool for generating that knowledge and
bringing it to us.
One way in which we are trying to think
about that is through our current 6(b) study.

In

February of this year, we issued an order to some
large technology platforms in an effort to understand
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the nature and competitive implications of some of
their nonreportable acquisitions.

That is one way in

which we at least are grappling with some of the same
questions.
The one response that I would offer is I
don’t think any notification system is ever going to
be the whole answer.

We will never have a merger

notification system of any kind — we will never find a
magic answer to these thresholds, whether it’s size of
person, size of deal, or something else — that
captures all competitively troubling acquisitions and
is workable for agencies and for the parties.
That to my mind begs the questions not just
of what the thresholds should do in isolation, but
what else matters.

I think there are critical roles

to be played — to touch on the second thing that I
will come to in a second — by other enforcers,
including particularly State AGs in the United States
and national authorities in Europe, to bring matters,
to act as sort of knowledge generators for the center,
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to bring matters to their attention.
And then for the agencies to develop robust
channels to the market, to hear from competitors,
ultimately even from consumers themselves, in ways
that can put things on our radar.

I think that kind

of thing is always going to be a critical complement
to merger notification.
Obviously, the other big-ticket item is the
referrals from the national agencies.

We of course do

not have that, but we do have State Attorneys General.
We find consistently that they are a critical part of
what we do.

We actually just last week finished

trying a case in Philadelphia alongside the
Pennsylvania Attorney General.

We are currently suing

Vyera Pharmaceuticals with New York and six other
states.

We find them to be both a source of cases and

referral in exactly this way and really significant
support on the cases that we do bring.
All things considered, I thought it was
wonderful speech and it really sounded themes that are
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front and center of mind for us, and that I think
signal a series of very promising developments both in
Europe and over here.
MR. SOVEN:

Fantastic.

That was very

helpful.
We are going to go about 3000 miles west,
having stayed away from D.C. for a while, we will
pivot back to D.C. and the East Coast of the United
States and the United States as a whole.
Bruce, if you haven’t noticed — and for
those who haven’t noticed — we are in a political
season here in the United States.
MR.

HOFFMAN:

MR. SOVEN:

What?!?

Exactly. At least in

conventional times — and who knows if these times are
conventional or not — this is the time in any
administration where both the people who work or
worked in the administration and those outside are
looking at the box score; taking stock; seeing what
was done, what was not done.

Those who are perhaps
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angling for some new things would say, “Well, nothing
was done,” and those who are there correctly point
out, “Look, an awful lot was done.”
For what it’s worth, as a personal note, I
worked for lots of different people of lots of
different persuasions at both agencies, and I always
saw them do it straight-up and never turn down a case
that people thought was the right case to bring.
But you were on the front lines for thirtysix months, running half the COO operation of the U.S.
antitrust agencies.

What is your take on what

happened in this Administration?
MR. HOFFMAN: Thanks, Josh, and thanks to
everybody, and thanks very much for the opportunity
from Fordham and the various sponsors for me to join
this panel.
far.

It has been a lot of fun to listen to so

The prior panel was really good also.

I think

we have a lot to talk about.
Before I answer your question, Josh, I want
to make one quick point about something that Daniel
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touched on and that Axel and Isabelle both mentioned.
I think it’s right when you say, “Well,
thing are changing quickly; therefore, something needs
to happen quickly.”

As the pace of competition picks

up, as the pace of innovation picks up, antitrust has
to respond in some way.
Exactly the same thing was said in the late
1990s, by the way, in almost literally exactly the
same words, about dot-com and so forth.
not a new thing.

So this is

This is a recurrent, every ten- or

fifteen- or twenty-year kind of cycle, where we hear
this.
But I do think there is real room for
caution about the idea that because the industrial
landscape writ large, the economic landscape writ
large, is changing really fast, we therefore need to
regulate more or restrict more.

I do not think that

is likely a good policy decision, and I also think it
is very unlikely in the United States — to touch on a
point that, as Daniel said, we’ll come to a little bit
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later — I think that kind of notion is not likely to
receive a sympathetic audience in the courts.
Turning from that to the question you asked,
just in terms of box scores, there is a narrative out
there — this is sort of a constant media narrative —
that whenever there are Republican administrations
there is less enforcement and whenever there are
Democratic administrations there is more.

The same

has been said about the last now closing in on four
years.

There is the narrative out there that there

was less enforcement, and in fact there have been some
pretty poor analyses statistical analyses that have
tried to show that, although they do that in
statistically unsound ways.

We’ve actually looked at

this pretty closely.
I’ll talk about the announcement that Ian
Conner made a couple days ago about it.

You see

enforcement, but what you find is that there is no
evidence of any kind of decline in enforcement.
actually pretty steady in merger enforcement as

It is
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between the Obama terms — particularly the second
term, which is closer in time and probably more
relevant — and the last four years.
For example, in the second term of the Obama
Administration, the two agencies together had an
average of forty enforcement actions each year; in
three years of the Trump Administration, the two
agencies together averaged forty enforcement actions
per year in mergers.

That average is actually going

to climb, I think, because of the FTC’s phenomenally
busy last fiscal year, where there were twenty-eight
merger enforcement actions brought, which is, I
believe, the highest since 2001.

But I do not have

the comparable stats for DOJ over the last fiscal year
so I do not know what the net average will be.
Another metric you could look at is
litigation.

During the four years of the second Obama

term, the two agencies initiated a total of twenty-two
merger litigations.

By that I mean filing litigation

to block a merger where there was not a settlement.
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The case is filed — and sometimes parties abandon when
that happens; sometimes they actually litigate; who
knows? — but there were twenty-two such cases during
the four years of the second-term Obama
Administration.
There were twenty-two such cases during
three-plus years of the Trump Administration.
this does not include the last fiscal year.

Again,

That is

exactly the same number although over a shorter
period.
You do see a difference.

Under the second-

term Obama Administration, there were twelve FTC
merger litigations and ten at DOJ.

In the first three

years of the current Administration, there were
sixteen FTC merger litigations and six from the DOJ.
I do not know, though, if that actually reflects any
kind of statistically valid difference.
You are getting into such a small set of
numbers when you’re talking twenty-some-odd litigation
cases that small changes in case mix — the things that
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are presented to you — could actually produce changes
on the margin.

You know, one or two fewer cases or

one or two more cases move the needle when you are
this level.
But certainly, when you look at the number
of litigations, the level of enforcement activity,
there is absolutely no support for the notion that
enforcement is down. In fact, I think likely we will
conclude when we look at the current statistics that
enforcement is up relatively speaking, at least in a
small way.
I think that is consistent with the
experience of people who have been in front of the
agencies.

I think that you have seen a lot of

aggressive cases.

The FTC has brought a number of

challenges to five-to-four and six-to-five mergers —
not always successfully, but quite aggressively.
DOJ has brought fewer litigations, but it
has brought some big ones and some pretty risky and
daring ones, including the ATT/Time Warner case and
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the Sabre/Farelogix case, where there were pretty
unusual theories that were brought to bear and pursued
in actual litigation.
So, just in terms of the overall track
record — and I think this is important from a client
perspective to understand — you are not looking at an
environment where enforcement is down — quite the
contrary — and there is no reason to think that is
going to change in any material way.
MR. SOVEN:

I think that’s right.

If you

look at the second request issuance data, it is
really, really consistent.
I should also point out it is certainly true
that Republican administrations have been critiqued
for supposedly taking their foot off the gas pedal a
bit, but also, honestly, in the last week people on
both the left and the right have been critiquing some
of the no decisions of the Obama Administration.

A

lot of this just depends on where you sit at the time
and whether you want to look back or look forward.
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Axel, let me put a completely unfair
question to you:

From your perspective, has Bruce got

it right in characterizing what has really been sort
of the consensus landscape when you push out the
rhetoric of what is going on in the United States, or
are we in fact missing some cases that from the
European vantage point should be brought?
MR. SCHULZ:

I agree it is a little unfair

question, but that’s fine.
I really can just make some comments on some
anecdotal evidence.

I have been doing this now for a

few years, and I do not see a big difference at the
enforcement level during the Obama or the Trump
administrations.
I have had the honor of being involved under
the Obama Administration in the first ever vertical
merger for twenty years.

That was surprising.

That

was clearly important, and everybody said, “Okay,
sure, under Obama what do you expect?”
At the same time, recently I was involved in
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a case where the FTC had looked at and was assessing
non-overlapping products.
But really I do not see a big difference in
terms of the enforcement level of four or five years
ago to today.

But again, this is just anecdotal

experience.
We have been discussing how to solve the
riddle for the authorities to pick up cases which they
think are important.

At the moment that is difficult

because either you meet the threshold or you do not;
you meet the test or you don’t.

It is not really pick

and choose for the authorities at the moment.
have to do whatever comes in.

They

At the moment I find it

is a little bit tricky for enforcement authorities.
MR. SOVEN: That is a great point.

It’s a

really relevant point that sometimes gets lost.

There

is a clamor for a certain type of case — and maybe it
is the right type of case and maybe it is not — but
either no one has proposed that sort of merger or no
one has engaged in that sort of conduct, which makes
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it awfully difficult for competition authorities
throughout the world to bring that case when it is not
in front of them.
MR. SCHULZ: Of course this will all change
now in Europe with Article 22.
MR. SOVEN:

That could be.

Sometimes you

can create demand by generating supply, or something
like that, even at the government level.
Let’s stick with the United States a little
bit more to kind of pivot from what Bruce was talking
about.

As Bruce said, the antitrust agencies, rightly

or wrongly, have brought some pretty high-profile,
daring stuff both at the federal level — the FTC’s
Chemicals case; the DOJ’s ATT/Time Warner and the
Sabre/Farelogix case — and the state level. I spent
the last two years working closely with the states
collaboratively on T-Mobile/Sprint, which had its own
sort of novel aspect to it.
Daniel, people are understandably asking,
“Well, were those relatively few government losses the
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results of judges just not getting it and missing and
sidestepping what are perfectly valid 21st-century
theories; or is the reason the outcomes were averse to
the government that the theories were in fact novel
and wrong and/or the facts did not really support it?
A lot there, Daniel, but you think about
these things, so what’s up?
MR. FRANCIS:

There is a lot there for sure.

I am also aware that I should try to be as brief as
possible given that we have our nascent competition
theme that we keep alluding to and I do not want to
hold up that discussion.

But let me try to say a

couple things.
The first is just a more general
institutional observation — really, by footnote,
agreeing with Bruce — and point out a couple of
examples, including the ones that you mentioned.
As you know, and as Bruce alluded to, there
are a lot of calls at the minute for increased agency
action by the FTC as well as DOJ and states and
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others.

I will say a couple of things about that.
Number one, just subjectively, my lived

experience of being there is that everyone is working
all the way around the clock and, as Bruce mentioned,
the numbers really support that.

I really think this

fiscal year has seen more merger enforcement actions
than in any fiscal year in the last twenty.

So,

number one, I would say the agencies, to agree with
Bruce, are very active.
Number two, the piece that gets left out of
the discussion a lot but which you touched on in your
question, our merger enforcement system requires us to
bring and prove cases not just before neutral
adjudicators but before neutral non-specialist
adjudicators.

Sometimes that piece of the enforcement

architecture gets left out of the discussion of what
the agencies are doing, can do, and should do.
I wouldn’t want to suggest for a minute that
the agencies abdicate to courts.

I think we have a

long track record of developing the law and pushing
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for change in the law when we think the courts are
wrong. I think that happened with hospital mergers; I
think it happened with reverse payments; I think it
happened with state action — there is a pretty long
and quite distinguished list of issues where the
agencies have really pushed back on court decisions
that had it wrong.
But I also think that we should be very
clear about the fact that what courts do is and should
be a real decision.

Antitrust enforcement is in very

significant measure an exercise in allocating very
scarce enforcement resources, people and dollars, and
if the things we think about — you know, we think
about the impact of bringing a particular case, but we
also think about our ability to fix it, and of course
judicial practice is a huge element of that.
Just by way of some examples, I am going to
talk about mergers, but I think the same is true of
conduct as well — we could talk about Amex; we could
talk about Qualcomm — but just to talk about merger
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cases.
To take one from the FTC, Evonik/PeroxyChem
in February of this year was a case where we assembled
a pretty powerful record demonstrating that the right
way to think about market definition in a particular
space was through the lens of supply-side
substitutability.

It is not often seen, but the

concept is that it is easy for firms to switch
backwards and forwards between making red widgets and
making blue widgets, then firms producing both of
those things can be in the same market because it is
easy to move between them.
While recognizing the validity and principle
of that theory, the court applied a very restrictive
approach that I think in practical terms is going to
cast a very long shadow over efforts by private
plaintiffs or by the government to bring that kind of
case.
You mentioned Sabre/Farelogix.
is a great example.

I think that

Obviously, one major theme in the
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discussion that we will have in a minute is platform
competition.
striking.

Aspects of the Sabre decision are very

You have a long evidentiary record of

parties regarding each other as competitors, the court
even concluding that they were competitively
significant in really distinctive ways, and then the
court turns around and says, “But as a matter of
antitrust law a multisided two-sided platform cannot
compete with a single-sided business.”

That really

strains economics and law, which I think is grounded
in some of the more troubling aspects of Amex.
You also mentioned Sprint/T-Mobile.

That is

the one of some of these recent examples with which I
am least personally familiar.

It was very clear that

there was a pretty robust structural case at least.
think there was a HHI delta of 600–700.

I

The court,

looking at some combination of efficiencies and a
weakened competitor defense and then some sort of
institutional deference, concluded that the parties
had successfully rebutted that structural presumption.
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I do not have a strong view and I am not
sophisticated enough in the details of that case to
have a strong view about the bottom line.

But I will

say (1) weakened competitor defenses are ten a penny
before the agencies; and (2) when it comes to
efficiencies, we usually require pretty significant
showings of efficiency in order to offset a strong
structural case.
I think those are a good selection of
examples.

If I were going to add one more, I would

add the AT&T/Time Warner merger, but I am cognizant of
time, so let me hand back the baton.
MR. SOVEN:

I appreciate it.

All good

there.
As I have signaled to my panelists, we are
going to pivot a little bit.

We have been dancing

around killer acquisitions, nascent acquisitions,
speculative merger cases, so I am going to ask all of
the panelists to comment on that topic.

They can

comment both rhetorically and substantively.
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Rhetorically, if you have a favorite label to give
these, by all means, this is a good opportunity to
stake your claim as to the right term of art.

More to

the point, what do you think about them?
To kick it off, the way I think about these,
for what it’s worth, is Bill Baer testified just a few
days ago before Congress that it is virtually
impossible under U.S. law to win one of those cases.
Now, he didn’t really say why.

My explanation of

“why” is there are usually probabilistic bets that you
could tell a story that a large technology company —
including some of the ones we are talking about — is
buying something that could six years down the road
with a 10 percent probability be a really big deal and
be disruptive; or there is a 90 percent chance nothing
is going to happen — nothing is going to happen if no
merger happens and nothing is going to happen if the
company buys it.
I think that issue has been both challenging
for the U.S. enforcement agencies as to whether to
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bring the case or not and even more challenging for
courts as to what to do with that.
Isabelle, you have talked about those and
you alluded to those in your comments.

Why don’t I

kick it back to you?
MS. DE SILVA:

Thank you, Josh.

I think first there is the issue of whether
we are able to look at those mergers.

We talked

already about Article 22 of the Merger Regulation
2004.
We also did some proposals at the national
level that were twofold.

The first one was to create

an ex post merger control, which would be quite close
to the one you have in the United States or in other
countries in Europe, to look at those mergers.

The

second was to create a new mandatory obligation for
some big platforms to inform us of all the
acquisitions that they do.

That doesn’t mean that

each and every acquisition should be notified
formally, but at least to give us this information
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about what types of companies they buy.
I think one of the most difficult questions
is: How do we analyze those cases and which are the
cases which should be blocked?
We set up a number of questions related to
that in a paper we published a few months ago about
competition issues in digital.

We set up a list of

the questions that seem most important for us.
One was when we do competition analysis, how
do we take into account the nonprice parameters?
This, in a way, should be the simplest question, but
it still needs to be said that we have a lot of tools
for impact on price but we do not have as many tools
for impact on privacy or quality of service, so that
can remain a challenge.
The second question is: Should we take a
longer timeframe into account?
already.

I alluded to that

Should we go to a five-year timeframe to

have a broader perspective?

Of course, it is more

difficult to predict what is five years away than two
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years away.
Another point we really underlined is that
new criteria are becoming crucial.

I am thinking

about the use of data and how a merger can impact the
community of users.

I think that in that respect the

acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp by Facebook are
really very good examples of the types of advantages
that come from buying a company

that was thought to

be in a different market than that of Facebook when it
was bought and now today we see that those three
services are completely merging.

They remain

different, but they are merging even in terms of
messaging applications.
I think we must look very closely to see how
we can decide which mergers should be blocked.

I

think that one of the key criteria, for me at least,
is: Is their position going to entrench the position
of the dominant or very strong company in a way that
would substantially lessen the competition in one or
several digital markets?

That is one of the questions
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that we need to ask.
Also we propose in our paper the fact that
we should take into account behavioral remedies.

They

might be in some cases quite fit for some digital
mergers.
We have a case today that has been dealt
with at the European level that raises some of these
questions, Google/Fitbit.

I will only mention it by

name because a lot of those questions I mentioned
arise in that case, especially the use of data and how
it can impact the position in the market of using
health data to create value.

So you see that those

questions that we raise are not theoretical; they are
today the questions that need to be answered to define
if we say “yes” or “no” to this type of merger.
MR. SOVEN:

Thanks very much.

Bruce, I’m hearing some risk in those
remarks for U.S. companies.

Let me ask you the

question this way, but given that we are in the debate
season you should feel free to answer it the way you
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wish to answer it.
MR. HOFFMAN:

Can I interrupt you too? I’m

just kidding.
MR. SOVEN:

Yes, absolutely.

I should

underscore that I am saying this all in the most
apolitical way in all respects.
The challenge again is a bunch of these
deals seem to create, let’s say, a 20 percent chance
of a problem.

My question to you is: If that is

right, is that unlawful under the U.S. antitrust laws;
and, if it is not, should it be?

What members of

Congress and a bunch of people seem to be saying is,
“Look, we hear you — we can’t prove it — we hear you
the risk may not trip the threshold.

But we think

overall the aggregate problem is so big that we should
bump the standard down and not take the chance.”
MR. HOFFMAN:

Josh, I think there is a huge

risk here to the economy at large.

I will start by

saying I don’t think there is anything wrong
conceptually with the idea of nascent acquisitions
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being problematic, or killer acquisitions or whatnot.
I have spoken about this a lot, I have a lot
of stuff out there, so I won’t waste everybody’s time
by reiterating things I have previously said, other
than to say that these are certainly areas where the
agencies have taken action.
I will say I thought Bill Baer’s comments
were interesting and they underscore for me a couple
of points that get to the risk that I want to
highlight.
There is not an empirical basis to say there
are a large number of acquisitions of nascent
competitors that should have been blocked and weren’t
and that caused competitive harm.

There is no

evidence to support that proposition, period, full
stop.
It is a myth.

It is something that people

have just said as if it was true without providing any
evidence to support it.

And when they are asked for

evidence, they usually cite one specific merger or
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another specific merger which when they have been
studied have generally been unable to conclude by any
kind of rigorous analysis whether in fact that prior
acquisition was actually anticompetitive.
So the theory is certainly sound — there
could be anticompetitive acquisitions of nascent
competitors — but there is no empirical evidence that
this is a widespread problem.

Nor, parenthetically,

is there any such evidence in relation to “digital
platforms” or “digital companies” — whatever that
means, by the way, because I think a lot of the
companies that get lumped into that category have lots
of differences — but the mere fact that those firms
have made a lot of acquisitions does not tell you
anything about whether those acquisitions were pro- or
anticompetitive.
My next point — getting back to the risk —
the idea that you change the enforcement calculus here
so that we should more aggressively prohibit mergers
that we do not know were anticompetitive or don’t know
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if they are likely to be anticompetitive strikes me as
foolhardy to say the least for a number of reasons.
First point:

A lot of what you hear today

sounds like “Efficiencies Offense Part 2” — “This
acquisition is going to make this firm a much better
competitor.
better.

It is going to serve its customers

It is going to give them better products.

They are going to really like it.

They will become

more loyal.”
“This is bad.
Wait.

Why?

We should stop it.”
If it is providing better

services, better goods, making its customers happier
so they are more likely to stay with it, how did that
become a bad thing?

This turns forty years of

antitrust on its head.
So we need to be very careful about
confusing efficiencies offense with actual
anticompetitive effects.
Second point: If you do not know if the
acquisition is likely to be anticompetitive, why
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should you stop it?

If it truly is anticompetitive,

we can always go back — the agencies do challenge
consummated mergers and you have Section 2 as a
backstop.

There are mechanisms by which you can deal

with problems after the fact.

If you cannot predict

confidently ahead of time or even with some degree of
error ahead of time that the merger is going to be
anticompetitive, the notion you should stop it I think
is highly problematic.
Third point:

A policy like that has

potentially substantial effects on the markets both
for funding for innovation and on innovation itself.
If you make it very difficult for startups to be
acquired, you are going to reduce the capital
available for startups, and that will have negative
effects on innovation.

I think that effect needs to

be taken carefully into account.
MR. SOVEN:
I’ve got it.

That was clear and to the point.

Helpful.

Axel, if I am in Europe I am still worried.

56

In the United States we have a challenging landscape.
I think your competitive landscape or enforcement
landscape is logarithmically more complex.
Notwithstanding that the probability of a negative
outcome for one of these acquisitions may be low, it
seems like there is a lot to think about strategically
when counseling clients in Europe.

What are your

thoughts on that?
MR. SCHULZ:

I just want to add with regard

to the nascent competition debate, which is currently
in a way starting only, similar types of problems have
been addressed already for quite a while by the
European Commission and other European agencies under
the label of “pipeline overlaps” or “innovation.”
You will remember that for many, many years
now the European Commission has looked into particular
pharma cases, and they also looked into not only
products on the market and whether there were overlaps
with relation to those products, but also pipeline
products.

In particular, it used to be pipeline
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products in Phase III development, pretty advanced, a
year or so before launch.

That was totally accepted.

Then came down Dow/DuPont with the concept
of innovation.

There was the idea of “Oh, there’s a

lot of innovation.
the lab.

There are a lot of R&D people in

Over time, somehow, they will come up with

something smart.

If we have two companies with a lot

of R&D people and scientists, then chances are that
the one-plus-one, the two together, will be even
stronger.”

The result is known.

This concept is not really entirely new.

It

is just now merging over to the digital industry.
That seems to be the new element here.
MR. SOVEN:

That is a really relevant point

and it’s a good segue to Daniel.

The FTC has

responsibility for pharma and life sciences and
medical devices.
Daniel, Axel’s point is competition lawyers
both in the public sector and private sector always
want to say they are coming up with something new and
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in fact we have come up a new way to invent the wheel.
The flip side is all of this is the same
only with a different title.

Those who do pharma work

have been worried about pipeline production in terms
of the FTC’s scrutiny — “Well, it’s Phase II, Phase
III; where are we?”

The Commission has done a lot of

work stopping a lot of transactions or modifying
transactions for products that haven’t come close to
the market.
More generally, what is your take on the
issue?

Do you see a distinction between tech and

pharma or pretty much are the tools we have good?
MR. FRANCIS:

Again there is a lot there.

Let me start by saying a couple of things.

Just to be

clear, I know others have touched on specific
companies or specific investigations, but I shouldn’t
be understood to be talking about any of that and I am
not going to talk about specific thresholds or tests.
Let me say two things to start.
(1)

To agree with Bruce, if there is a
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systematic claim that there is a programmatic failure
of antitrust enforcement to respond to a set of
phenomena that are widespread in practice and harmful
in practice, that is an empirical claim that requires
proof that I have never seen.

So I agree with that as

an observation about a programmatic historical failing
of antitrust.
(2) But, to disagree with Bruce, I do not
think that, at least in its most interesting form,
this question is a question about making antitrust law
more aggressive either in general or as applied to
some sector that we might call the “tech sector” — I’m
not sure what that is or how to define it — or
“nascent acquisitions.”
I think this is in its most interesting form
a question about how to apply the antitrust laws and
standards that we already have and for which we spend
so much time emphasizing to the market, to others,
their flexibility and their sensitivity to deal with
real competitive problems on familiar theories in
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markets across the economy.
I think Axel touches on something really
important when he emphasizes the consistency of this
project with what antitrust enforcers have been doing
for a long time.

Our orienting concerns are always

anticompetitive agreements; anticompetitive exclusion
by dominant firms, by single firms with monopoly
power; and anticompetitive acquisitions.

Same here as

in any other context.
Everybody agrees that the acquisition of a
competitor can be — sometimes is — unlawful, the
paradigm of anticompetitive conduct directed at a
promising or significant competitor to remove them.
So the question that we are talking about here is how
to apply that very familiar rule in settings where the
full scale of the competitive threat of either the
target or the acquirer, because it is not always the
case that the incipient party is the target in markets
such as these.
that.

I’d say a couple of brief things about
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First, Uncertainty of this kind is familiar
to us.

It is a part of the competitive process.

In

fact, the fact that competitive trajectories and
competitive effects are unpredictable is a huge part
of what we value about competition in the first place.
But it is true, I think, that in digital
markets, and in some of the markets that we have been
talking about today, some of that complexity and
unpredictability is particularly pronounced —
particularly nonprice effects, which can sometimes be
difficult to identify or measure. Let me agree with
Isabelle’s observation that we really would appreciate
some better tools for measuring and talking in an
organized way about some of these things that are not
easily quantifiable in our familiar ways.
This unpredictability flows from
unpredictable competitive trajectories, complexity of
nonprice effects, and also the fact that in markets
that are distinguished by strong network effects some
of the most significant competitive threats may come
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from products or services that are not close like-forlike substitutes of the dominant incumbent.
This is a huge policy question, and in
responding to it I am going to just identify a couple
of guideposts that I find quite helpful.
(1) Just to emphasize, I think this is about
how we apply our existing standards; it is not about
special pleading for tech or for nascent competition.
It is not about increasing the aggression of our
antitrust standards; it is about applying them.
(2)

We start, as we always do, from faith

in the competitive process.

We know that in cases

where there is a very close tie between the
competitive process on the one hand and a static
reduction in marginal cost on the other, our baseline
preference is for competition.
That is particularly important in the
acquisition context.

When we are talking about

conduct, often the hardest question is: Defendant is
doing practice XYZ.

Should we think of that as merits
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competition or should we think of that as something
else?

That is not typically the question on the table

when we are dealing with an acquisition.
There is great language in the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines that says something like “the
antitrust laws give the competitive process, not
operational efficiency, primacy in protecting
consumers.”

I find that a very helpful guidepost.

(3) Bruce talked, I think very importantly,
about error costs and our risks of chilling all kinds
of procompetitive activity in the economy.

I

wholeheartedly agree, but I often think we talk
asymmetrically about error costs and chilling.

I

think there are error costs to inaction — in
tolerating harm to consumers, harm to competitors,
harm to potential innovation, and in chilling
investment and entry and innovation in the markets
that are affected by anticompetitive conduct.

So I

there are error costs and there are risks of chilling
on both sides.

64

(4) In this case and in this setting, as in
all our others, ordinary course evidence is a very
helpful guide. Understanding what monopolists, merging
parties, defendants, or companies actually expected,
actually intended, based on their irreplicable market
knowledge that we as regulators cannot hope to
generate ourselves is a very helpful guide in close
cases where we otherwise find ourselves less certain
than we would like to be.
Let me stop there.
MR. SOVEN:

Thanks very much, Daniel.

Our panel, predictably, has done a fantastic
job covering almost all the topics we planned to talk
about.

There are a few we do not have time for.
I think we would be remiss in ending if we

do not touch upon what has been an enormous drumbeat
in the United States over the last twelve to twentyfour months of vertical mergers.
new Vertical Merger Guidelines.

The agencies issued
Some thought they

were great; some thought there wasn’t enough in them.
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People have been asking for guidance.
I will throw out as a proposition that I,
perhaps simplistically, have never thought this
concept was particularly complicated, at least in the
United States.

In the United States, if you have a

really big durable market share and you do a vertical
acquisition or engage in a collusionary conduct in
which the anticompetitive effects are pretty clear,
and the apple pie story is slim to nonexistent, you
lose, and you lose consistently, and you lose no
matter who is running the agencies.

Some people may

think that’s right some people may think that’s wrong,
but that is really what has been going on if you look
at the data. But maybe that’s not right.
Let me allow everybody a few moments to talk
about what is a complex subject, recognizing that, and
end on let’s think vertical.
Isabelle, again I will start with you.
MS. DE SILVA:

At least at the national and

European level, we look at vertical mergers with the
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idea that if there is a serious risk, then we will be
able either to block the merger or to have serious
commitments.
For me, the most topical case in recent
years was a case that involved the broadcasting
industry, Canal Plus/TPS, which really was one of the
biggest decisions in which the company had to comply
with a very wide set of structural commitments to be
allowed to go through with the merger.

We now have

some years to look back at that decision and see
whether it was correct.

This decision was confirmed

by the Supreme Administrative Court.

The idea is that

this decision did a lot of good in terms of protecting
those that might have been impacted by this vertical
integration.
So I have to say that in our view this type
of case can cause serious difficulties for the
companies and they should be aware when they consider
this type of merger that there will be difficulties
with the competition authorities.

67

MR. SOVEN:

Thank you.

Bruce, I think you may have a double-header
today, so let me ask you to go ahead in case you have
to jump.
MR. HOFFMAN:

I will just make a couple of

quick points.
One is, Josh, I will actually give a slight
caveat to the point you made.

As Dan O’Brien observed

once, in vertical mergers the potential for
procompetitive benefit is isomorphic with the
conditions that you highlight as potentially creating
the risk of anticompetitive effect.

So I think it is

just not the case that we can say in vertical, as we
can in horizontal, bigger share equals bigger problem.
In fact, often the inverse is true.
Second, I think the Vertical Merger
Guidelines that came out are an enormously important
step forward.

They are not perfect — nothing ever is

— but compared to what we had before they are
enormously better.
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Third, I think they recognize a critical
point.

They talk about it mostly in connection with

elimination of double marginalization (EDM), but it is
a really critical point that the Guidelines identify
and that I think bears some real careful thinking
about.

That is, in vertical mergers, unlike in

horizontal mergers, the mechanism by which output
restrictions or price increases upstream translate
into the required downstream harm — remember the
Vertical Merger Guidelines specify that downstream
harm is required because otherwise we just have rent
transfers and nobody cares about that — but the
mechanism by which those harms translate downstream is
exactly the same as the mechanism by which benefits
translate downstream.

In other words, unlike in

horizontal mergers, the passthrough of harm is
identical to the passthrough of efficiency or benefit.
So in a vertical merger under the new
Vertical Merger Guidelines, unlike in a horizontal
merger, the treatment of efficiency passthrough and
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harm passthrough is symmetric, as it should be because
that is the correct economic framework.
I will leave those bombshells to let
everybody debate while I bail out to go to another
thing I have to attend.
great.

My apologies.

This has been

Thank you all very much.
MR. SOVEN:

Awesome.

Thanks so much.

To be clear, the big is not the dispositive
factor in the out comes of U.S. vertical cases, be
they mergers or conduct cases.

Big and durable, as it

should be, is a prerequisite, but the only cases in
which we have had adverse findings under the U.S.
antitrust laws have been cases where there has been a
clear showing of anticompetitive effects — and,
frankly, the parties really haven’t had much to put
forward in terms of procompetitive effects.
In the parts of the Microsoft case that
Microsoft lost they really did not have very much. In
Dentsply and cases like that, they were all pretty
straightforward that “These are a problem and we are
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not seeing an efficiency story.”
MR. SOVEN:

Axel, appropriate for a European

conference, let me flip it back to you.
MR. SCHULZ:

Probably not time to say very

much, but I think Isabelle has already touched upon
the important points.
In Europe the review of vertical mergers is
maybe more prominent than in the United States.

In

the United States, it is more of an oddity I
understand.

In Europe, it is more prevalent and there

have been more cases in which vertical relations are
being reviewed.

There have been quite a number of

cases.
Maybe one is really quite interesting,
EssilorLuxottica/GrandVision.

I think the clock has

been stopped for the third time now.

There had been

the precursor to that case two years ago when Essilor
and Luxottica merged, and that was somewhat a
conglomerate/vertical merger.

One was producing the

lenses for glasses and the other one was producing the
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frames.

So is it vertical, is it conglomerate, or

somewhere in between?
Interestingly, that case had already gone
into Phase II in-depth investigation. It was a huge
investigation — I think 4000 opticians had been
consulted — because the two companies in their
respective markets were the market leaders.

But also

their market shares were not above 20 percent in each
of their respective markets, so it was not ultimately
a big deal, and the deal was cleared.
Now EssilorLuxottica is trying to acquire
GrandVision. GrandVision is a retail outlet with, I
believe, 4000 stores or something like that.
EssilorLuxottica has its own 1000 stores.

I don’t

know the facts so I cannot really comment, but it
seems that the clock is stopped for the third time, so
it seems to be a bit more problematic to get that
approved.
I really ought to say again that in Europe
vertical mergers are being looked at routinely.
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MR. SOVEN:

Daniel, you get the challenge

again of wrapping up a complex subject in just a
minute or two.

Go ahead.

MR. FRANCIS:

I am not sure I have anything

particularly interesting to add to the thoughtful
comments we have just heard.
I think everyone understands that vertical
transactions, just like horizontal deals, can be
harmful, but perhaps in some ways that are specific to
vertical deals the analysis can be more complex.
Bruce mentioned that foreclosure and EDM are
two sides of the same coin.

I would add by way of a

footnote to that that foreclosure is not the only
story of harm in a vertical transaction.

Access to

competitively sensitive information and coordinated
effects are things that I think we should take
seriously in the vertical context.
“one-trick pony” in some sense.

This is not a

But otherwise I think

his points and those of others are well taken.
Also, by way of echoing something that
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others have said, in the vertical transaction context
a big challenge for companies and others, including
private plaintiffs and agencies, is the relative lack
of clear guidance from the enforcement architecture.
I think it is wonderful that now, after so
many years, we have Vertical Merger Guidelines out
there.

The agencies have spoken, but now it is over

to the courts and to the diet of cases that will flow
through the agencies under these Guidelines.
Like everyone else, and to recall one of our
earlier discussions, it will be very interesting to
see what the courts now do.
MR. SOVEN:

Yes.

I think what is clear from

this fantastic panel and the great comments of the
panelists is that we are not even close to the end of
history in competition enforcement in the merger
sphere.
Again I want to thank the panel for their
work and effort.
I’ll flip it over to you, James.
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MR. KEYTE:

Thank you so much.

What an

excellent panel.
It has been a great first day so far, with
the tech panel, the mergers panel, the keynote
speakers and discussion.
Normally, what I would do now is to invite
everybody to exit the room and go get some food and a
glass of wine.

I will ask everybody to go get some

food and a glass of wine or something else that you
want to drink and then click back into our Plenary
Networking Session, where you get to network. You can
sit at tables.
and meet people.

You can get up and go to other tables
You can find people.

We will open

that up right away so you can do that glass in hand.
You just can’t share anything.
We will have a Fireside Chat after about ten
or twenty minutes of that with Barry Hawk, the founder
of the Institute — and everybody knows Barry — and the
iconic Bill Kovacic.
discussion.

That will be an interesting
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Following that, Freshfields is putting on
its networking event in the same technology.

You have

to exit and go back into their event.
We hope to see a lot of you in the
networking session to talk to Barry and Bill and then
onward to the Freshfields event.

